Department of Safeguards (SG)

Office of Deputy Director General

The Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Safeguards is responsible for the overall supervision of the Department and in particular, for the application of safeguards under agreements to which the IAEA is a party. The Department consists of six Divisions: three operational, one that is responsible for concepts and planning, one that covers information management, and another that provides technical support; as well as an Office of Analytical Services. Within the Deputy Director General's office itself, there is also a Section for Effectiveness Evaluation. This section, the Head of which reports directly to the Deputy Director General, is responsible for the evaluation of safeguards implementation and preparation of the annual Safeguards Implementation Report to the Board of Governors.

Three Operations Divisions

Each of the three Operations Divisions is responsible for the implementation of safeguards in a different geographical area. Division of Operations A is responsible for inspections in Australasia and East Asia; Division of Operations B is responsible for the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, some non-EU European states, and the Americas; and Division of Operations C is responsible for Europe, the Russian Federation and Central Asia.

The Operations Divisions play a pivotal role in verifying that there is no diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole.

At the level of nuclear facilities, each Operations Division conducts a comprehensive evaluation of all information available to it, which includes information provided by the State with regard to the design and operation of nuclear installations, the State's nuclear material accounting reports, and the results of inspectors' in-field activities carried out in order to verify the State's declarations. Inspection activities under comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) are based on safeguards criteria that have been developed for each facility type. In those States with an additional protocol, the inspectors have access to the State's entire nuclear fuel cycle, including information on certain research and development activities not involving nuclear material, and on the manufacture and export of sensitive items and equipment. Inspectors have a variety of verification activities to perform at a facility. Containment and surveillance techniques (i.e. the application of seals and the use of cameras and detectors installed at the facility) may be used so as to prevent undetected access to nuclear material or undeclared operation of the facility. In order to verify that the facility has been used as declared, environmental samples may be taken for analysis. The IAEA also makes use of unattended and remote monitoring data (surveillance, seals and non-destructive assay) of declared facilities with transmission of encrypted data. These are supported by (announced or unannounced) random inspections.

At the level of the State, the Operations Divisions conduct an evaluation of the consistency of the State's declared nuclear programme against the results of the Agency's verification activities under the relevant safeguards agreement, additional protocol (where applicable) and with all other information available to the Agency. In particular, a comprehensive State evaluation is conducted based on all information available to the Agency about the State's nuclear and nuclear-related activities.

Once the IAEA has confirmed the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in a State, a Broader Conclusion may be drawn and integrated safeguards (an optimized combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency) may be applied in that State. State-level integrated safeguards approaches are tailored to factors specific to a particular State, while still ensuring that safeguards are applied in a non-discriminatory manner.

The evaluations described above are periodically documented and reviewed by inter-departmental committees and then form the basis for the Safeguards Conclusions which the Secretariat draws on an annual basis.

Division of Concepts and Planning

The Division of Concepts and Planning is responsible for developing concepts, approaches and methods for safeguarding nuclear material, facilities and activities; preparing safeguards policy and guidance documentation; assisting inspectors with safeguards implementation issues; supporting advisory and policy-making bodies (e.g. IAEA Director General's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation); and conducting strategic planning for the Department. The Division also organizes 70-80 training courses annually for Departmental staff and personnel from Member States, and implements a quality management system to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of departmental processes.

Within this Division lies the Section for Programme and Resources, responsible for managing the Department's human (more than 700 staff) and financial resources (around €140 million per year). The Section prepares the verification programme and budget proposals to Member States; monitors and evaluates their implementation; manages funds allocated by Member States to the Department; prepares reports on performance and on the use of resources; and coordinates and provides guidance on the most effective utilization of financial and human resources.

Division of Information Management

The Division of Information Management provides the Department of Safeguards with services relating to data processing, secure information distribution, information analysis and knowledge generation, all of which are needed to draw independent, impartial and credible safeguards conclusions. The Division also manages the Department's information and communication technology architecture; manages information, including that related to analysis of nuclear material accounting information; analyses other verification information (e.g. environmental sample results); processes information from the Voluntary Reporting Scheme and Illicit Trafficking Database; and collects and analyses open source information, including trade information, and commercial satellite imagery.

Division of Technical Support

The Division of Technical Support is responsible for providing scientific and technical support to the Operations Divisions including: design, development, testing, calibration, installation and maintenance of safeguards equipment; performance and contamination monitoring of equipment; inspection logistics; coordination and management of Member State Support Programmes and related extra-budgetary funds.

Office of Analytical Services

The Office of Analytical Services is responsible for the analysis of nuclear material and environmental swipe samples, the provision of associated sampling and quality control materials, as well as the coordination of sample shipment logistics, and the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL). The office contains the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL), comprised of the Environmental Sample Laboratory and the Nuclear Material Laboratory (including the On-Site Laboratory in Rokkasho, Japan), and a Coordination and Support Section, responsible for the planning, coordination and reporting of the analytical service of the NWAL; radiation protection; quality management; training and other technical support. The ECAS (Enhancing the Capabilities of Analytical Services for Safeguards) project aims to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities for conducting particle analysis, and to meet the additional safety and security requirements of a modern laboratory.

For more information, see Safeguards →